Two sides of the same coin. Unpacking Rainer Forst’s basic right to justification by Rummens, Stefan
Two Sides of the Same Coin
Unpacking Rainer Forst’s Basic Right to Justification
Stefan Rummens
In his forceful paper, Rainer Forst brings together many elements from his previ‐
ous discourse-theoretical work for the purpose of explaining how the basic rights
enjoyed by citizens in the context of a constitutional regime could be justified. In
line with venerable Kantian ideas, Forst argues that our human dignity as persons
implies that we are all free and equal normative authorities with regard to the
normative orders we are being subjected to. This authority implies that we all
have what Forst calls a ‘basic right to justification,’ which means that we all have a
right to participate as equals in the discursive procedures of reciprocal and gen‐
eral justification in which these norms are being determined. This basic right to
justification, in turn, serves as the ‘single and properly moral ground’1 for all of
the basic rights we enjoy as citizens because, as Forst explains, a commitment to
the basic right to justification always necessarily implies a commitment to these
other rights as well.
I find Rainer Forst’s discourse-theoretical approach overall highly congenial and I
also agree with most of the more specific arguments he presents on this particu‐
lar occasion. I agree that our basic rights should be grounded in a moral manner
and that this ground is properly explicated in terms of our dignity and authority
as free and equal persons. Nevertheless, I would like to raise two issues of concern
that remain after reading his argument. The first issue is perhaps more a matter
of clarification. It relates to three different distinctions that Forst introduces in
his paper but which, in my view, appear to be related in ways that he fails to the‐
matize. A clarification of these matters is important, however, because they per‐
tain to the primary distinction between the a priori reconstruction of basic rights
by philosophers and the discursive construction of basic rights by citizens. My
second point is somewhat more critical and concerns Forst’s claim that the right
to justification can provide a ‘single’ source for both the private and the public
autonomy of citizens. Here, I will argue that this claim is somewhat misleading
because the ‘right to justification’ as understood by Forst is a substantively rich
concept which also already comprises what I will call the ‘right to choose your
own ends.’ A more perspicuous presentation of the discourse-theoretical ground‐
ing of basic rights should refer to the basic right to justification and the basic
right to choose your own ends as two different but inseparable rights – two sides
of the same coin – which jointly provide the moral ground for our basic rights as
citizens.
1 Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights. A discourse-theorethical approach’, Netherlands
Journal of Legal Philosophy 45(3), 20.
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1 Justifying basic rights: a priori reconstruction versus discursive
construction
In his paper, Forst introduces three interesting distinctions. The first one con‐
cerns a distinction between ‘two different kinds of normative arguments,’2 the
second one a distinction between ‘status-based’ and ‘reciprocity-based’ arguments
supporting basic rights3 and the third one a distinction between ‘two levels of jus‐
tification and specificity’ at which basic rights are being determined.4 Forst sim‐
ply presents these distinctions separately without further discussing the possible
connections that might exist between them. Although he thereby clearly assumes
that we are dealing here with three different distinctions, my suggestion would be
that they represent, in fact, three different versions of the same distinction.
The most basic distinction, in my view, is the first one between ‘two different
kinds of normative arguments’ or, shorter still, ‘two kinds of normativity,’ which,
according to Forst, is typical of all constructivist understandings of moral and
legal norms.5 The first kind refers to the normativity of the principles and ideas
of practical reason. In the case of Forst’s theory, these are ‘the principle of recip‐
rocal and general justification’ and the ‘moral notion of free and equal persons as
equal normative authorities with a right to justification.’6 The second kind refers
to the normativity of the norms which are generated by the constructivist proce‐
dure itself. In the case of the discourse theory of law, these are the norms that are
generated within the actual democratic procedures in which citizens jointly justify
the legal norms they are being subjected to.
This distinction is interesting because it tells us something about the different
roles that can be taken up by philosophers.7 Discourse theorists such as Jürgen
Habermas or Rainer Forst are mainly concerned with the first kind of normativ‐
ity. Their aim is to analyze the ideas and principles of practical reason and to
develop, more specifically, a rational reconstruction of the basic features of our
moral and political language games as practices of reciprocal justification. This
reconstruction is a priori in the sense that it tries to analyze the conditions of possi‐
bility of these practices and, thus, to determine under which circumstances valid
norms can be generated within actual moral or political discourses. This means, in
other words, that the first kind of normative arguments aim to reconstruct the
preconditions for the construction of norms belonging to the second kind.
The discourses in which actual moral or legal norms are being constructed have to
be inclusive in the sense that all people who will be subjected to these norms
2 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 13.
3 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 22.
4 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 23.
5 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 13.
6 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 13.
7 See also Stefan Rummens, ‘Deliberative Justice,’ in The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democ‐
racy, eds. André Bächtiger, John Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark Warren (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, forthcoming).
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should be able to participate as equal co-authors. This means, in the case of rights
and laws, that this procedure has to be open to all citizens and not simply to phi‐
losophers. Of course, many philosophers develop all kinds of elaborate theories
explaining the specific rights and laws a properly just society should have. From
the point of view of discourse theory, however, these theories of justice can never
replace the actual public debate between citizens, but merely serve as possibly rel‐
evant contributions to that debate. These kinds of philosophers are no longer
engaged in an a priori or transcendental reconstruction of practices of justifica‐
tion, but are contributing to these practices as actual participants.
Importantly, discourse-theoretical approaches assume that basic rights can be
justified on the basis of normative arguments of both kinds. Indeed, both Haber‐
mas and Forst argue at length that basic rights can be grounded in the ideas and
principles of practical reason itself. One of the key points of Habermas’s Between
Facts and Norms is that the basic system of rights, which forms the core of every
constitutional regime, can be reconstructed on the basis of discourse-theoretical
premises.8 Similarly, Forst’s point in the paper discussed here is precisely that the
right to justification provides the moral ground for the basic rights citizens hold
as subjects of the constitutional state. Both philosophers also emphasize, at the
same time, that the a priori reconstruction of rights necessarily operates at a very
general and abstract level and that actual processes of deliberation between citi‐
zens are needed to generate more specific interpretations of these abstract rights.
This means, of course, that these rights should also be generally and reciprocally
justifiable norms in the second sense of normativity distinguished by Forst. Basic
rights can be reconstructed by philosophers as preconditions of deliberative prac‐
tices of justification. But they are also, at the same time, justifiable within these
very practices by the citizens themselves.
The fact that basic rights can be justified in these two distinct ways is less surpris‐
ing than might appear at first glance. It testifies, rather, of the continuity that
exists between the two kinds of normativity under consideration. Forst rightly
emphasizes that ‘the normativity of constructed norms depends on the prior nor‐
mativity of the principles and the standing of the agents of construction.’9 As a
result, ‘one can only get as much normativity out of a procedure as one invests in
it from the beginning.’10 The core normative idea that is doing the bulk of the
normative work here is, in my view, the notion of ‘reciprocity.’ As I will further
explain in the next section, the idea of reciprocity controls both the a priori form
of the practices of justification and the substantial content of the outcomes that
are generated within these practices.
This brief account of the distinction between two sorts of normativity suggests
that we now first have a look at the third distinction I mentioned at the outset.
8 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democ‐
racy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
9 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 13.
10 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 13.
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This is the distinction between two levels of specificity. On the first level, Forst
talks about generally defined basic rights such as ‘we find in human rights decla‐
rations or (somewhat more concretely) in constitutions.’11 On the second level,
‘the particular content of basic rights must be specified discursively’12 on the
basis of actual moral, political and legal processes of justification. The distinction
between these two levels of specificity has been thematized by Forst on several
earlier occasions. Thereby, he has usually labelled it the distinction between ‘min‐
imal’ or ‘fundamental’ justice on the one hand and ‘maximal’ or ‘full’ justice on
the other.13 These labels indicate that accounts of minimal justice are essentially
concerned with characterizing the general outlines of a minimal or fundamental
structure of justification which needs to be in place in order for people to be able
to actually engage in discursive processes of will-formation which allow them to
develop a more maximal or full account of justice for their own society.
In my view, the distinction between the two levels of specificity essentially coin‐
cides with the distinction between the two sorts of normativity. When philoso‐
phers develop a minimal account of justice they are trying to determine the mini‐
mal conditions of justice that have to be met before actual processes of discursive
justification can get off the ground. A minimal account of justice at the first level
is therefore an a priori reconstruction of the conditions of possibility of the dis‐
cursive practices of justification which, at the second level, provide more specific
content to these a priori requirements of justice.
Of course, specific human rights declarations are already significantly more spe‐
cific than the ‘abstract scheme of rights’ which Habermas reconstructs in Between
Facts and Norms or the still general list of rights reconstructed by Forst in his
present paper. This shows, I believe, that human rights in a sense occupy the grey
zone that exists between the a priori reconstruction of the discourse theorists
and the actual processes of lawmaking by citizens. Human rights declarations are
no longer entirely a priori in the sense that their specific formulations already
reflect a significant amount of historical contingency. As a result of this (limited)
contingency, human rights declarations are not entirely immune to discursive
challenges in the name of reciprocity. At the same time, however, human rights
are indeed deeply ‘congealed and solidified’ – to use Forst’s felicitous phrase –
precisely because they are much more general and abstract than more specific
forms of legislation.
Although human rights illustrate that the boundary between the a priori recon‐
struction and the discursive construction of basic rights is blurred, they do not
undermine the distinction itself. A blurred boundary is a boundary nonetheless
and the existence of the grey zone does not detract from the fact that some argu‐
ments are clearly on one of the two sides of the boundary. At the same time, the
11 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 23.
12 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 23.
13 See, for instance, Rainer Forst, ‘Two Pictures of Justice,’ in idem, Justice, Democracy and the Right
to Justification. Rainer Forst in Dialogue (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
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distinction between the general level of justification of human rights and the
more specific level of justification of ordinary legislation does not constitute a
distinction that adds something essentially new to the primary distinction
between reconstruction and construction. The second distinction operates on the
same continuum as the first one.
This brings us, finally, to the remaining distinction introduced by Forst, the dis‐
tinction between status-based and reciprocity-based arguments for basic rights. I
must concede that I find this distinction the least tractable of the three. Its
nature and its purpose remain somewhat obscure. Forst defines a status-based
argument as one that ‘shows how certain basic rights are necessary to institution‐
alize and secure the very status of being a justificatory equal free from legal, polit‐
ical or social domination.’14 A reciprocity-based argument, in turn, is one that
‘shows how certain rights claims cannot be reciprocally and generally rejected
among equal justificatory authorities.’15
In my view, one of the main problems with this distinction is that the idea of ‘rec‐
iprocity’ does not merely take centre stage in the second type of argument, but
actually already does all of the normative lifting in the first type of argument as
well. The idea of reciprocity is here somewhat hidden, but nevertheless clearly
present through the concept of non-domination. As Forst explains earlier on in
the paper, the idea of persons being free from domination means for him that
persons should not be subjected to norms that are not reciprocally justifiable.16
The central role of the idea of reciprocity that is thus indirectly present in the
first type of argument, clearly reveals itself when we look at the way in which
Forst argues for the right to individual liberty, a right which he considers to be a
prime example of the kind of rights that are justified by status-based arguments.
In his reconstruction of this right, Forst claims that
‘individual liberty is justified by the basic respect for others as normative
equals who would be subjected to domination if some members of society
were in a position to define the liberty of others in terms of reasons that can
be reciprocally and generally rejected, for example in terms of religious rea‐
sons that are not sharable or paternalist considerations that purport to
reflect the “true interests” of others who do not share them.’17
How this type of reasoning differs from a reciprocity-based argument is unclear.
In both cases the fact that certain rights cannot be reciprocally rejected seems to
do all of the normative work. The claim by Forst that reciprocity-based arguments
‘do not point directly to the status-implication of certain rights as does the first
justificatory strategy’ is also not very helpful in clarifying the matter. The main
reason for this is that the concept of ‘status’ also remains rather underdeveloped.
14 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 22.
15 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 22.
16 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 8.
17 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 23-24.
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According to Forst, the right to individual liberty and the right to freedom of
expression are examples of rights that refer ‘directly’ to our status as equal nor‐
mative authorities. In contrast, the right to religious liberty or the freedom of
artistic expression belong to the group of rights that do not point to this status
directly. Something probably escapes me, but to me, this distinction seems moot.
The only way in which I could try to make sense of the distinction between sta‐
tus-based and reciprocity-based arguments is again in terms of the primary dis‐
tinction between the a priori reconstruction and the discursive construction of
basic rights. In the reconstructive phase, philosophers are analyzing and unpack‐
ing the principle of reciprocal justification and the idea of persons as free and
equal authorities. An a priori analysis of the conditions of possibility of our moral
and political justificatory practices thereby reveals that our status as equal partici‐
pants in these practices necessarily presupposes a commitment to basic rights. In
the constructive phase, it is subsequently up to the citizens themselves to make
use of their status as normative authorities to engage in actual political dis‐
courses allowing them to construct more specific interpretations of these basic
rights which are generally and reciprocally justifiable. This reformulation of the
distinction between the reconstructive and constructive justifications of basic
rights shows in what sense the former could perhaps be understood as a form of
status-based justification and the latter as a form of reciprocity-based justifica‐
tion.
My own understanding of Forst’s distinction would imply that all basic rights
could be justified in both a status-based and a reciprocity-based manner. This fol‐
lows from the fact that – as indicated before – all basic rights can be justified in
both an a priori reconstructive and a discursive constructive manner. This impli‐
cation seems to pose a problem, however, since it fits badly with Forst’s claim
that the two kinds of arguments he distinguishes map onto two distinct groups of
basic rights, whereby one group contains rights that can be grounded in a status-
based manner and the other group rights that can be grounded in a reciprocity-
based manner.
In response, I would like to indicate that the problem seems to be mitigated by
the fact that the two groups of rights are perhaps not as distinct as Forst himself
suggests. In fact, the group of rights he associates with reciprocity-based argu‐
ments seems to contain rights which are more specific versions of more general
counterparts in the group associated with the status-based arguments. The latter
contains the right to personal liberty, whereas the former specifies this into, for
instance, a right to religious liberty. The latter contains the freedom of expres‐
sion, whereas the former specifies this into, for instance, the freedom of the press
or the right to artistic expression. This relation between the two groups of rights,
whereby the one is the more specific counterpart of the other, fits again very well
with the primary distinction I have in mind. As argued, arguments pertaining to
the a priori reconstruction of basic rights operate at a more general and abstract
level than the arguments pertaining to the discursive construction of basic rights.
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On the basis of these considerations, I would like to conclude that the distinction
between two forms of normativity, the distinction between two levels of specific‐
ity and the distinction between status-based and reciprocity-based arguments
should be understood as three different versions of one primary distinction. This
primary distinction concerns the difference between the a priori reconstruction
of basic rights by philosophers and the discursive construction of basic rights by
citizens. Its omnipresence illustrates that this primary distinction effectively con‐
stitutes a defining trait of the discourse-theoretical approach to basic rights.
2 The right to choose your own ends
My second point concerns the thesis regarding the co-originality of human rights
and popular sovereignty, or, alternatively, the co-originality of the private and
public autonomy of citizens. In this regard, I generally agree with Rainer Forst’s
criticism of Jürgen Habermas’s reconstruction of this thesis. According to Haber‐
mas, the combination of the medium of law with the discourse principle (D)
– stating that the validity of norms is constituted by the consensus that could be
reached through reasonable deliberation – provides the dual source that grounds
the abstract scheme of rights protecting both forms of autonomy.18 As I have
argued elsewhere,19 I agree with Forst that Habermas fails to appreciate that the
normative lifting in this reconstruction is essentially done by the discourse prin‐
ciple rather than by the medium of law and that, moreover, the discourse princi‐
ple can only do this work if it is understood as a genuinely moral principle rather
than, as Habermas does, a mere principle of validity. Consequently, I find Forst’s
own attempt to ground the private and public autonomy of citizens in the right to
justification as a properly moral principle markedly superior to Habermas’s origi‐
nal approach.
In spite of my general agreement, I am less convinced, however, by Forst’s addi‐
tional claim that the right to justification provides a ‘common normative ground
that explains [the] common origin’20 of the private and public autonomy of citi‐
zens. Forst is right that Habermas’s ‘dual source’ approach is not convincing,
mainly because the medium of law as such does not play the foundational role
Habermas ascribes to it. Nevertheless, I would like to submit that the basic right
to justification – as the properly moral alternative for the discourse principle – is
not as ‘singular’ a source as Forst makes it out to be.
The basic right to justification is in itself a quite substantive concept that needs
to be further unpacked. This unpacking reveals that Forst – without explicitly
acknowledging it – relies on the typically ‘dual’ structure that characterizes the
authority of human persons in the modern age. The basic right to justification
18 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 120-31.
19 Stefan Rummens, ‘Debate: The Co-Originality of Private and Public Autonomy in Deliberative
Democracy,’ The Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 4 (2006): 469-81.
20 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 20.
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captures our authority as equal co-authors of the norms that structure our social
world. The flipside of this authority with regard to the social word is, however,
the authority we have with regard to our own private lives. This second and com‐
plementary form of authority is best captured by what I would like to call the right
to choose our own ends. This is the right which allows us to make our own choices
with regard to our own subjective world without thereby having to justify these
choices to others. I thereby do not mean to suggest that the right to choose our
own ends implies a commitment to the ethical ideal of leading our lives in a maxi‐
mally autonomous way. In my understanding, this right is compatible with the
choice to lead life in line with some traditional religious practice. Importantly,
however, the decision to lead your life in accordance with this religious practice is
your own and cannot legally be imposed upon you by others.
My main criticism with regard to Forst’s discourse-theoretical reconstruction of
basic rights is that his reliance on the basic right to justification is, in fact, a reli‐
ance on two different but inseparable rights at the same time. The basic right to
justification, as he understands it, is a package which contains not only the basic
right to justification more narrowly construed as the right to participate in the
practices determining our moral and legal norms but also the different but insep‐
arable right to choose our own ends in our own private spheres. This dual struc‐
ture already clearly shows up at the beginning of Forst’s paper when he first char‐
acterizes the basic right to justification, the idea of non-domination it contains
and the basic rights it gives rise to. The basic right to justification is clearly not
only a right to participate, but also a right to ward off domination by others.
‘The basic right to justification implies not only political rights of participa‐
tion, but all of those rights that grant you the normative power to ward off
and overcome various forms of domination or unjustifiable subjection.’21
The same duality returns within the concept of non-domination itself. Although
Forst distances himself from a neo-republican understanding of the concept by
emphasizing that it refers, in his understanding, also to a status activus in which
people can co-author the norms structuring society, he thereby does not abandon
the more ‘passive’ understanding of non-domination as a form of individual free‐
dom which allows us to choose our own ends.
‘Freedom from domination not only means being respected as someone who
enjoys a legally, politically and socially non-dominated equal status secured
by certain rights; it also means that whether you enjoy this status or not is
not something that is decided by others without the possibility of your
involvement.’22
21 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 9. Italics added by author.
22 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 8. Italics added by author.
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As Forst already announces on these very first pages, the very same duality will
therefore also return within the structure of the basic rights themselves.
‘Basic rights are not just rights to be passively protected in one’s status as a
legally, politically and socially non-dominated person; they are, in a reflexive
sense, also basic rights to determine the rights and duties that define this sta‐
tus.’23
That Forst’s reconstruction of the basic rights as grounded in the right to justifi‐
cation relies in an ineliminable manner on our right to choose our own ends can
be shown as follows. To start with, it is important to appreciate that our right to
justification is a very demanding right in the sense that not just any kind of justi‐
fication will do. Forst imposes clear constraints on the kind of justification that
we are entitled to and captures these constraints with his criteria of ‘reciprocity’
and ‘generality.’ It is instructive, next, to have a closer look at what the require‐
ment of ‘reciprocity’ consists in according to Forst.
‘Reciprocity means that no one may make demands that he or she denies to
others and no one may impose his or her non-generalizable views, interests
or values on others.’24
This criterion functions as the equivalent of Habermas’s principle of universaliza‐
bility (U), which states that reasonable consensus can only be reached on the
basis of norms that give equal concern to the interests and values of all people
affected by the norm.25 For Forst, similarly, the idea of reciprocity expresses an
ideal of impartiality which assumes that the interests and values of the individual
participants in the debate matter. They matter, more precisely, in the sense that
all individuals enjoy a prima facie right to choose their own ends in accordance
with their own interests and values. This prima facie right can be trumped only
on the basis of good reasons referring to the equal freedom of others to choose
their own ends.
Because the ideal of reciprocity implicitly presupposes our right to choose our
own ends, it comes as no surprise that the idea of reciprocity does most of the
normative work in Forst’s reconstruction of the basic rights, not only when he
uses the so-called reciprocity-based arguments, but also when he uses the so-
called status-based arguments. In the previous section I have, for instance,
already quoted the argument which Forst uses to support the right to individual
liberty. Here, the gist or the reasoning is that our liberty cannot be constrained
on the basis of reasons that can be ‘reciprocally rejected’26 because that would
otherwise lead to an unacceptable form of domination. This reasoning thereby
23 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 8. Italics added by author.
24 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 14.
25 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,’ in idem,
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 43-115.
26 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 23-24.
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illustrates again that our equal right to choose our own ends provides the yard‐
stick that determines which forms of justification are acceptable and which are
not. The fact that individual liberty can be grounded in the right to justification is
thus not surprising: this type of liberty simply reflects our authority to lead our
own lives as we see fit, an authority that is already contained in the idea of recip‐
rocal justification itself. To repeat an earlier quote from Forst himself: ‘one can
only get as much normativity out of a procedure as one invests in it from the
beginning.’27
To be clear, my critique of Forst does not target his reconstruction of the basic
rights itself. Although the unpacking of the right to justification presented here
might suggest that there is a certain circularity in the argument for basic rights
(what comes out, is already presupposed), I personally do not object to this kind
of circularity. The idea of a discourse-theoretical reconstruction is not to come up
with a solid ‘foundation’ for basic rights, it is merely to present a perspicuous
overview of how the different core ideas and principles of practical reason that
constitute our practices of justification are intertwined. My only problem with
the way in which Forst presents his reconstruction of basic rights is that it one-
sidedly focuses on our authority in the social world at the expense of our author‐
ity in the subjective world and thus produces a somewhat unbalanced account of
the normative core of our system of basic rights.
My suggestion that the source of these basic rights has a dual structure should,
however, not be misunderstood. My claim is not that there are two different and
separable sources for basic rights. The right to justification and the right to
choose our own ends are two different but, at the same time, inseparable rights.
They do not represent two different coins, but rather two sides of the same coin.
Their inseparability means that on a properly Kantian or discourse-theoretical
understanding of these rights, the two mutually presuppose each other. Our right
to choose our own ends is always a qualified right in the sense that it is limited by
the equal right of others to also choose their own ends. This limit is furthermore
not an a priori boundary, but a boundary that can only be specified on the basis of
actual discursive procedures in which we all exercise our equal right to justifica‐
tion. Explaining how, the other way around, the basic right to justification also
presupposes the right to choose our own ends is equally straightforward. If we
start from the basic right to justification, it is immediately clear that such an
equal right only makes sense – can only sustain the hope for a reasonable agree‐
ment – if we accept that not all forms of justification are legitimate, but that jus‐
tifications will have to be reciprocally acceptable in the sense of giving equal con‐
cern to the interest and values – the ends – of all people involved.
Forst’s one-sided focus on the basic right to justification is understandable to a
certain extent in the sense that he wants to show in what way discourse theory
provides a corrective to Kant’s original grounding of basic rights. He presents the
27 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 13.
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basic right to justification explicitly as an alternative to Kant’s ‘innate’ or ‘original’
right of persons, which Kant characterizes as follows:
‘Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar
as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a univer‐
sal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his
humanity.’28
Here, Kant clearly focuses on the side of the coin which represents our (qualified)
right to choose our own ends. The discourse-theoretical corrective that Forst pro‐
poses emphasizes that the limits between my own freedom and the freedom of
the other need to be drawn in actual discursive practices in which autonomous
human beings exercise their basic right to justification. This addition is indeed an
important improvement of the original Kantian view. At the same time, however,
the corrective should not lead us astray in thinking that the right to choose our
own ends could simply be reduced to the right to justification or that our author‐
ity as authors of our own lives could be reduced to our authority as co-authors of
norms in the social world. These two forms of authority are equally important
and equally original and represent two inseparable yet irreducibly different
aspects of our dignity as human persons.
Although the dual structure of our human authority is ineliminable, it is true that
from a broader historical perspective this human authority can appear as a ‘singu‐
lar’ source. Human authority appeared with the advent of the modern age and the
disappearance of divine authority as the typically premodern source that decided
how human life should be organized.29 In the words of the French philosopher
Claude Lefort, this historical transition testifies
‘to the disappearance of an authority which subjugated each and every indi‐
vidual, to the disappearance of the natural or supernatural basis which, it was
claimed, gave that authority an unassailable legitimacy and an understanding
both of the ultimate ends of society and of the behaviour of the people it
assigned to specific stations and functions.’30
In the premodern era, divine authority controlled our public as well as our indi‐
vidual lives. Both were inextricably intertwined and the distinction between the
private and the public sphere as we now know it did not properly exist. The tran‐
sition to the modern age is therefore characterized by two simultaneous changes
with regard to the ultimate sources of authority. On the one hand, divine author‐
ity has been gradually replaced by human authority. In that historical sense, there
is now indeed a new ‘singular’ source of authority. On the other hand, however,
human authority immediately took on a dual structure for which there is no
28 Forst, ‘The Justification of Basic Rights’, 12.
29 Stefan Rummens, ‘Deliberation Interrupted. Confronting Jürgen Habermas with Claude Lefort,’
Philosophy & Social Criticism 34, no. 4 (2008): 383-408.
30 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 34.
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counterpart in the premodern world. As private individuals, we have assumed
authority over our own lives and are now free to choose our own ends. As mem‐
bers of society, we have claimed joint authorship over our moral, political and
legal norms and now decide for ourselves how we want to organize our irreducibly
pluralistic communities.
The point of Forst’s discourse-theoretical reconstruction of basic rights is to
determine the moral core which grounds – in a groundless manner – our modern
moral and political practices of justification. My claim is that his reconstruction is
generally convincing but that there is still room for some improvement. Most
importantly, his current account regretfully glosses over the dual structure which
characterizes this moral core and which constitutes, in fact, a defining feature of
our modern condition. Human authority is the new source which replaces divine
authority, true enough, but this source is best understood as a coin with two
sides. Our basic right to justification as members of the social world has, as its
inseparable flipside, our basic right to choose our own ends as private individuals.
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